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Abstract
How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war? Existing 
research on the institutional causes of peace often focuses on how institutional designs, as the 
outcomes of reform processes, reduce post-war violence and promote peace. The literature does 
less frequently address how the politics that characterise reform processes affect the legitimacy 
of institutions and whether or not violent protest ultimately takes place: this risks omitting key 
explanations of how institutional reforms contribute to peace and the mechanisms by which this 
occurs. By examining the case of Nepal, where clashes between protesters and security forces 
over constitutional provisions for federalism have killed more than 60 people since August 2015, 
this study shows that three factors of the territorial reform process contributed to the onset of 
post-war ethnic violence. These included: (1) elite control of decision-making; (2) tight deadlines 
that promoted backtracking on previous commitments; and (3) the embedding of single territorial 
reforms in a ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparked fear of discrimination 
among ethnic minorities.
Keywords
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Introduction
How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war? 
This question has been central to previous scholarship on the institutional causes of 
 post-war peace and is of great interest to practitioners promoting peace in war-torn 
 societies. The literature on post-war territorial arrangements, such as federalism or 
 territorial autonomy, has yet produced inconclusive results. While some authors argue 
that institutions that increase territorial autonomy promote peace by mitigating fears of 
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political exploitation (Lake and Rothchild, 2005), others find that territorial deals lower 
the chances for peace by increasing risks of separatism (Brancati, 2006). In this article, I 
argue that part of the explanation for these inconsistent findings is that research analys-
ing post-war territorial institutions often suffers from an insufficient conceptual approach 
to the relationship between such institutions and peace. Most notably, the scholarship 
tends to focus on how territorial institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform pro-
cesses, help promote peace after war (Cederman et al., 2015; Hartzell et al., 2001). The 
literature does not to the same extent address how the politics characterising reform 
processes affect the legitimacy of institutional outcomes and, ultimately, whether or not 
violent protest against these institutions takes place.
This article addresses this limitation and analyses how rather than institutional designs 
alone, (1) the dominance of elite actors in decision-making; (2) the effect of tight dead-
lines on these actors’ decision-making quality; and (3) the embedding of single territorial 
reforms into a ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparks fears of margin-
alisation, are factors that can exacerbate tensions and spark violence.
To this end, the article takes on the case of Nepal, which has thus far received only 
limited attention in the academic debate on post-war federalism. Nepal’s peace process 
is often regarded as a relative success, as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or 
CPN (M), successfully demobilised and transformed into a political party. In the post-
war period, however, politics have repeatedly taken a violent turn. Most recently, on 20 
September 2015, a protracted constitution-making process ended when 507 of 598 
Constituent Assembly members approved a new constitution. The document is meant to 
consolidate Nepal’s transformation from a centralised Hindu kingdom to a federal and 
secular republic. Many observers celebrated it as a ‘progressive milestone’1 and the ‘end 
of the peace process’ with the Maoists (Bhattarai, 2015b). But weeks before the constitu-
tion was promulgated, protests erupted in Nepal’s southern Tarai plains. This region is 
home to various identity groups, including those who self-identify as Madhesis. Who 
constitutes as ‘Madhesi’ has been described as ambiguous by scholars (Miklian, 2008) 
and is challenged by some communities in Nepal (Pandey, 2017). I here refer to Madhesis 
as people living largely, but not exclusively, in the Tarai, ‘whose mother tongues [… 
include] Hindi, Urdu, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Bengali, and dialects of these’ (Kantha, 2011: 
157) and who ‘maintain close linguistic, cultural, [and] ethnic ties’ with people across the 
Indian border (Jha, 2014: 166). According to the 2001 census, this internally heterogene-
ous group makes up 33% of Nepal’s population, although the total population of the 
Tarai comprises almost 50% of Nepal’s population (Kantha, 2011).
Madhesis are one of several identity groups in Nepal who have long exhibited sub-
stantial anger against political elites in Kathmandu for the latter’s failure to alleviate 
widespread political and economic discrimination against minorities (cf. Gellner, 2007).2 
They hold that particularly the federalist reforms foreseen in the new constitution will 
result in their further marginalisation. Madhesi activists thus staged protests against the 
proposed reforms and erected a blockade of the Nepal–India border. By January 2016, 
almost 60 people had died in clashes between security forces and activists. As the gov-
ernment mobilised the army for the first time since the end of the war with the Maoists, 
observers feared that the events were only the beginning of an ethnic war in the Tarai 
(International Crisis Group, 2016). While this fear has not materialised to date, tensions 
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are still high and violence has not stopped. Notably, the Tarai saw several violent clashes 
and multiple deaths in the lead up to Nepal’s long-awaited local elections in May and 
June 2017. Protesters cited the government’s refusal to amend the constitution according 
to their demands before the polls. Due to these protests, local elections have been post-
poned in one Tarai province until September 2017.
To what extent did the politics of Nepal’s territorial reform process contribute to the 
violence in the Tarai? By analysing this question, the article makes important contribu-
tions to several research agendas. With its conceptual focus on the politics, rather than 
the outcomes, of territorial reform processes, my analysis adds to theory-building in the 
research on institutions and peace. With a focus on Nepal’s peace process, I empirically 
advance a debate that has been dominated by statistical research and case studies on 
Africa. Moreover, the article contributes to the research on Nepalese politics, as previous 
analyses have tended to focus on the socio-economic, rather than institutional, determi-
nants of violence or peace in Nepal (e.g. Murshed and Gates, 2005).
I also present novel empirical data on post-war politics in Nepal. My analysis is 
informed by two rounds of fieldwork carried out in September and October 2015 as well 
as in April and May 2017. Thus, my fieldwork took place in the immediate aftermath of 
the promulgation of the constitution in 2015 as well as during the first round of local 
elections in 2017. In sum, I conducted 55 semi-structured interviews with political party 
and government representatives, Maoist ex-combatants and commanders, current and 
former police officers and army generals, civil society leaders, Madhesi activists, jour-
nalists, and members of the international community. Some interviewees whom I met in 
2015 I interviewed again in 2017, in order to confirm previous statements or ask for 
updated accounts on the peace process. I conducted most interviews on the condition of 
anonymity and in Lalitpur or Kathmandu. Some interviews were carried out with the aid 
of an interpreter; this concerned those with Maoist combatants, commanders, as well as 
police or army officers. Interviews were arranged with the help of the local non-govern-
mental organisation (NGO) Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative, as well as through specific 
targeting and snowball sampling.
Relying on interviews as a primary source of data clearly entails challenges. Most 
notably, the information received in interviews can be biased or selective. Therefore, I 
asked the same questions to people from all political orientations in order to check facts 
across the political spectrum. However, my 2015 sample of interviewees includes more 
Maoist ex-combatants, commanders, and politicians, than representatives from other 
parties, as the latter were engaged in coalition talks at the time. This problem did no 
longer exist in 2017. An additional check on the ‘Maoist bias’ of the 2015 sample is that 
because the Maoist movement experienced several splits in the post-war period, many 
Maoist interviewees spoke very critically of their previous comrades. Beyond inter-
views, I draw on existing scholarship, policy reports, newspaper articles, as well as social 
media postings, particularly by Madhesi activists.
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. In Section 2, I summarise 
existing research on the relationship between (territorial) institutional reforms and post-
war peace. Drawing from arguments in the wider peace and conflict research agenda, I 
then shift the analytical focus from the outcome to the politics of reform processes, and 
present an argument about the relationship between institutional reform and peace that 
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focuses on elite dominance, tight deadlines, and the embedding of reforms. I then briefly 
outline Nepal’s war and post-war periods. Section 4 examines the evidence to determine 
support for my argument. In my conclusion, I suggest avenues for future research.
Institutional reform and post-war peace
As ‘institutional reform’ I understand a process aimed at designing formal elements of a 
political system to promote non-violent conflict management between identity groups 
(Reilly, 2001). A growing number of studies today regard such reform as being of utmost 
importance for promoting peace after war (Ansorg and Kurtenbach, 2017; Paris and 
Sisk, 2009). The idea is that if war occurs because identity groups seek to violently 
address their political or economic exclusion, then reforming institutions so that politics 
are more inclusive should have a pacifying effect. The literature analyses a variety of 
institutional reforms, but awards particular focus to the role of political and territorial 
power-sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).
The ‘institutional outcomes’ argument
The dominant perspective in previous scholarship is that power-sharing institutions are 
an important determinant to explain post-war peace. The political power-sharing model 
as described by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) relates to Lijphart’s concept of consociation-
alist democracy (Lijphart, 2007) and captures the notion of an executive and/or legisla-
tive body jointly controlled by the warring parties or ethnic groups of a conflict. This 
arrangement is expected to reduce grievances resulting from political exclusion or solve 
credible commitment problems (Walter, 2002). Empirically, the relationship between 
power-sharing and peace has often been assessed in statistical analyses that support the 
suggested theoretical argument, but that focus almost exclusively on how power-sharing 
reduces risks of recurring war, rather than on how it curbs other types of violence (e.g. 
Cammett and Malesky, 2012; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008).
The statistical debate is complemented by a substantial body of case studies, primarily 
on Africa, that are more critical of how joint rule reduces the risk of war (e.g. Simons 
et al., 2013). Tull and Mehler (2005), for instance, find that power-sharing promoted 
renewed war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as it rewarded the use of violence 
with a seat in office. The pacifying effect of power-sharing is also questioned by integra-
tionist approaches to institutional reform that suggest designing institutions so that they 
do not build on, but reduce the salience of group cleavages (Reilly, 2001). Studies also 
point out that while power-sharing is a meaningful driver of peace as it eases conflicting 
parties’ uncertainties over political survival, it is profoundly undemocratic. This is 
because institutional guarantees for a seat in office entrench existing group cleavages 
and contradict the uncertain nature of democracy (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005).
Scholars define the territorial power-sharing model as institutional arrangements that 
increase the autonomy of identity groups over specific territorial units, such as through 
federalism (Zanker et al., 2015). In theory, proponents of territorial power-sharing argue 
that it increases the chances for peace by mitigating fears of political or economic exploi-
tation among marginalised groups, by decreasing the chances of separatist conflict, as 
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well as by providing for a system of checks and balances (Bermeo, 2004; Lake and 
Rothchild, 2005). Territorial power-sharing is also said to reduce the security dilemma of 
warring parties, as it provides rebel groups with a ‘zone of influence’ outside the control 
of the central government (Zanker et al., 2015: 73). Empirically, there seems to be even 
more profound correlative, statistical evidence for the peace-conduciveness of territorial 
power-sharing in the aftermath of war than for political arrangements (Jarstad and 
Nilsson, 2008). Case studies further conclude that there are often no viable alternatives 
to territorial deals (Bieber and Keil, 2009).
Other authors however point out that territorial power-sharing arrangements can also 
create parallel structures of authority within a state and mobilise identity groups to 
engage in separatism and secessionism (Brancati, 2006). At worst, it can create a ‘para-
dox of federalism’ that reinforces, rather than mitigates, inter-ethnic tensions (Erk and 
Anderson, 2009: 191). Given this, several studies find that the effects of territorial power-
sharing are conditional on the wider institutional nature of a state, and that territorial 
power-sharing is most successful when it is combined with political power-sharing 
arrangements at the level of the central government (Cederman et al., 2015; Wolff, 2009).
The ‘politics of reform’ argument
Against this background, and drawing on the wider peace and conflict research agenda, 
I here suggest that post-war peace is a result of the politics of institutional reforms, rather 
than of institutional designs alone. In this regard, I do not limit my understanding of post-
war peace to a narrow definition of the absence of re-emerging intrastate war. War termi-
nation is often followed by new forms of violence that must not necessarily follow 
previous incompatibilities or be perpetrated by actors who fit into war-time cleavages 
(Westendorf, 2015). I thus look at the extent to which violent organised or spontaneous 
protests, riots and strikes erupted in response to institutional reforms; as well as at how 
violent behaviour by the government against unrest unfolded.
I hold that by concentrating on institutional designs as the determinants of post-war 
violence, previous research has often overlooked other factors of a territorial reform 
process that affect its legitimacy and thus also violent protest: In the worst case, this 
concentration risks omitting key variables or mechanisms that show how territorial 
reforms reduce violence and add to peace. In my analysis, I look at three factors in the 
politics of territorial reform: (1) the dominance of elite actors; (2) the effect of tight 
deadlines on these actors’ decision-making quality; and (3) the risks posed by embedding 
territorial reforms into a wider ‘concert’ of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparks 
fears of marginalisation. I present these factors here as independent elements, but discuss 
in my concluding remarks how they may be internally linked.
The component of elite actors highlights the political and social players involved in 
the institutional reform process. Institutional designs clearly do not appear at random, 
but are the result of extensive negotiation processes between domestic and international 
actors. Following scholarship on civil society engagement in peace processes, it is rea-
sonable to expect that how inclusive these negotiations are and what configurations of 
actors are granted decision-making authority in these negotiations affects the legitimacy 
of institutional designs. This means that elite-controlled processes result in lower levels 
88 Cooperation and Conflict 54(1)
of institutional legitimacy, while more inclusive reform processes that do not only pro-
tect the interests of elites result in more legitimate institutional designs (cf. Zanker, 
2014). This is, for instance, reform processes that include non-elite players, such as civil 
society representatives or political parties without a history of insurgency, increase per-
ceptions of representation and recognition among the broader population and hence 
lower risks of violence motivated by public grievances over institutional designs. The 
idea that inclusive reform processes shape institutional legitimacy has featured more 
prominently in qualitative contributions to the academic debate. However, as Svensson 
(2014) points out, the debate has overall given scant attention to the inclusion of actors 
other than the warring parties or their international custodians.
The component of tight deadlines refers to the issues of time and timing in peace 
processes. In many peace processes, deadlines are promoted by international mediators 
or domestic parties in order to accelerate deadlocked negotiations, create exit strategies 
for international peace operations, sequence peace processes, or favour pragmatism in 
institutional reform processes after war (Pinfari, 2012). However, strict deadlines can 
also be unconducive to implementing complex institutional reform processes. For 
instance, sticking to tight deadlines and unrealistic schedules in the confusing realities of 
a peace process can prevent antagonistic actors from reaching ‘common visions’ of how 
they should move forward (Van Eck, 2007: 118). It can also place new elites inexperi-
enced in governing at the national level under considerable stress and time pressure. 
These conditions can reduce institutional legitimacy if they limit decision-makers’ abil-
ity to consult with all relevant actors on the specifics of reforms. Hasty decisions taken 
to meet deadlines may also decrease the transparency of the reform process, resulting in 
lower levels of trust toward its results.
The component of embedding institutional reforms refers to the manner by which 
actors implement their decisions in the aftermath of war. Negotiating and implementing a 
specific institutional reform (such as federalism) is a process that does not take place in a 
vacuum, but is conditioned by the underlying contextual conditions of a post-war society 
as well as by the numerous other reforms taking place at the same time. Basedau (2017: 
23) refers to this joint effect of reforms as the ‘concert of institutions.’ Hence, the way 
decision-makers embed single institutional reforms in broader reform processes should 
shape the legitimacy of institutional outcomes. This means that institutional reforms 
embedded in reform processes that as a whole alleviate fears of marginalisation should 
curb post-war violence, and vice versa. A prominent example of the interaction between 
reforms is the link between power-sharing and disarmament, demobilisation, and reinte-
gration (DDR) processes. While DDR can raise fears of vulnerability for warring parties, 
this can be alleviated by offering party representatives positions in power-sharing. 
Previous research has so far granted little attention to such interactions (Basedau, 2017).
War and post-war violence in Nepal
The Nepalese state and its institutions have long exhibited profound discrimination 
against minority groups. From 1846 to 1951, the rule of hereditary prime ministers within 
the Rana family created a deeply unequal political system that systematically benefited 
high-caste Hindu men from the central hill region, while reliably discriminating other 
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ethnic, linguistic, social, or religious groups (Hachhethu, 2007). The subsequent authori-
tarian panchayat system further enshrined such discrimination between 1960 and 1990, as 
it preserved Nepali and Hinduism as the state language and religion (Sijapati, 2013). In 
1990, the First People’s Movement (Jana Andolan I) helped bring about a transition to 
democracy, but the traditional elite of high-caste Hindus from the hills still dominated the 
political system (Lawoti, 2010).
Between 1996 and 2006, the Maoist insurgency capitalised on the minority grievances 
resulting from this long-standing political and economic discrimination. The insurgency 
began to attract Madhesis into its ranks particularly from 2000 onwards, when the rebels 
promised to create an autonomous Madhesh province in a future federal state (Kantha, 
2011). In 2001, Nepal’s King Birendra was killed in a massacre at the royal palace and his 
brother Gyanendra became king. Unlike Birendra, Gyanendra was not reluctant to mobi-
lise the army against the Maoists, which escalated the intensity of the war. In 2005, 
Gyanendra dismissed the elected government and restored all political power in the royal 
palace. This step united the Maoists, the mainstream political parties, and civil society in 
protests against the king (Whelpton, 2013). The ensuing Jana Andolan II paved the way 
for a peace deal between the Maoists and the political parties in 2006. In 2008, the Maoists 
won the first elections of the post-war period, and the elected Constituent Assembly 
moved on to abolish the monarchy and declare Nepal a republic.
Although the Maoists gave up their arms, peace has remained fragile as Nepal has 
witnessed several eruptions of post-war violence over the past decade. In 2007, an 
interim constitution negotiated by representatives of the Maoists and political parties – 
all ‘blind to the fact that it was six hill Brahmin – and a couple of Chhetri – men […] 
making all the decisions’ (Jha, 2014: 165) – failed to address long-lasting Madhesi 
demands for an autonomous Madhesh. Student protests erupted in the Tarai and esca-
lated into violence after a Madhesi protestor was shot by Maoist cadres. This Madhesi 
Andolan killed over 30 people. It was followed by negotiations culminating in an eight-
point agreement in February 2008 (Sijapati, 2013). In this document, the interim coali-
tion government formally accepted the call for an autonomous Madhesh.
But in the following years, the series of coalition governments negotiated primarily 
between the Maoists, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal 
(United Marxist Leninist) or UML, failed to provide the political stability necessary to 
uphold the promise of constitutional provisions for federalism. The Maoists remained 
the only major party at least rhetorically committed to an identity-based federalist struc-
ture as demanded by Madhesis. NC and UML leaders held that such a system would 
create ‘ethnic ghettoes’ (International Crisis Group, 2016: 11) and lead to a ‘breakup’ of 
Nepal.3 The parties’ inability to settle on a constitution resulted in the dissolution of the 
first Constituent Assembly and elections for a second one in 2013. The Maoists – now 
the Unified CPN (M) after merging with another party – lost a large share of votes, hav-
ing failed to deliver on their promises to significant parts of the populace.4 But writing 
the constitution was again deadlocked over the question of federalism. Only the urgency 
to rebuild after the 2015 earthquakes helped speed up this process. As reflected in the 
September 2015 constitution, the Maoists entered into a compromise and accepted geog-
raphy-based federalism as promoted by the NC and the UML. The constitution was 
endorsed by 537 of the 598 Constituent Assembly members. Of the 61 members who 
boycotted the vote, 58 belonged to Madhesi parties (INSEC, 2015).
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Madhesi activists had already begun to mobilise resistance against the constitution in 
August 2015, arguing that its provisions for federalism increased rather than alleviated 
their discrimination. By January 2016, almost 60 individuals had died in clashes between 
security forces and activists. In February 2016, the parliament approved a constitutional 
amendment that reacted to some of the demands, but many Madhesis saw the changes as 
insufficient. Presently, these tensions remain unsolved and repeatedly result in deadly 
protests, most recently in the lead up to local elections in May and June 2017. For 
instance, three Madhesi protestors were killed and 16 injured in March 2017 when secu-
rity forces opened fire during an election-related protest by the Joint Democratic Madhesi 
Front (Amnesty International, 2017). Many observers regard the Madhesi conflict as the 
most pressing security challenge in Nepal for the years to come.5
The politics of institutional reform in Nepal
With regard to the 2015 constitution, Madhesis (and other groups) have particularly chal-
lenged four provisions. First, they believe that a system of geography-based federalism 
(detailed in Article 56.3) will result in their further marginalisation, as the delineation of 
federal units (along geographical markers, such as rivers) means they do not constitute a 
majority in any of the units. Second, they reason that the constitution’s citizenship law 
(Article 11) hurts the rights of women and Madhesis. Third, they argue that the constitu-
tion introduces an electoral law (Article 84.1) that drops previous legislation on propor-
tional representation and leaves Madhesis under-represented in the federal parliament.6 
Fourth, they ask for population-based electoral constituencies, instead of constituencies 
based on geography and population as enshrined in Article 84.1. While these demands 
relate to the outcomes of the constitution-making process, the violence that ensued can-
not be understood based on these outcomes alone.
The dominance of elite actors
First and foremost, the violence in the Tarai is also the result of the protestors’ perception 
that the constitutional and institutional reform processes were squarely dominated by 
elite politicians in Kathmandu and meant to serve their interests, while marginalised 
groups were not invited to partake in decision-making. This is a contested claim, as 
Nepal’s constitutional process has in the past been hailed as ‘exemplary’ (INSEC, 2015) 
for its thorough public consultations that invited civil society representatives to voice 
opinions in constitutional committees.7 The question, however, is how inclusive this pro-
cess really was, as civil society organisations tend to be dominated by high-caste, Nepali-
speaking Hindu men from the hills – the same elite that dominates the political scene 
(Sijapati, 2013). In 1999, for instance, this group held ‘90 per cent of top positions in 
prominent Nepali NGOs’ (Braithwaite, 2015: 15). For Madhesis, the inclusion of civil 
society did thus not, on its own, make for a participatory reform process. Similar con-
cerns were voiced with regard to public consultations on constitutional provisions, to 
which Madhesis were at times denied entry on the premise that these meetings ‘were 
open only to party cadres’ (International Crisis Group, 2016: 13).
As a result, and in a repetition of the negotiations on the 2007 interim constitution, voices 
from the Tarai were grossly under-represented in deciding on institutional reforms. This 
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under-representation directly affected individuals’ decisions to protest. Not only did Madhesi 
activists resent the actual federalist design, they were also ‘equally critical of the manner in 
which the constitution was finalised’ and that a ‘narrow coterie of senior party leaders 
reached compromises […] behind closed doors’ (Ghale, 2015). What chiefly angered them 
was that the leaders of the four largest parties in parliament –NC, UML, Maoists, and the 
Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) – signed a 16-point agreement on 8 June 2015 to 
resolve any remaining contested constitutional issues. A Madhesi was thus a signatory, but 
this did not increase the deal’s legitimacy, as MPRF chairman Bijay Kumar Gachhadar was 
not perceived as an ‘advocate of the Madhesi cause’ (International Crisis Group, 2016: 7) 
but as an opportunist who had betrayed the Madhesis (The Voice of Madhesh, 2015).
In Article 3 of this 16-point agreement, the political leaders vaguely agreed that a 
commission would finalise the demarcation of federal units following the promulgation 
of the constitution. However, 10 days later the Supreme Court ruled that this demarcation 
would have to be undertaken by the Constituent Assembly. On 5 August 2015, the four 
major parties thus issued a map of the proposed federal state boundaries. This map was 
again drawn without consulting Madhesis, and it immediately sparked protest across the 
Tarai. As Shah (2015) argued, the violence ‘can be attributed to a […] demarcation of 
federal states without consultation with all stakeholders. […] If the ruling political par-
ties […] are unwilling to listen to the legitimate demands, what options do Madhesis [… 
have]?’ Observers argue that any reform proposal issued solely by elites in Kathmandu 
could have sparked new protest (Strasheim and Bogati, 2016). One NC member stated: 
‘We should not have decided constitutional matters without taking Madhesis into confi-
dence. We could have passed almost any document if we had not alienated them’ (in: 
International Crisis Group, 2016: 7).
A particularly salient issue in the long-running conflict between the traditionally rul-
ing elites and the Madhesi community has been the racially charged rhetoric Madhesis 
often encounter in the public debate. They have long been exposed to racial slurs and to 
being framed as Indians or illegal migrants (Jha, 2014). This aspect has resurfaced with 
regard to the 2015 constitution and the federal reforms.8 Sha (2015) lists exclusionary 
language and attitudes among hill elites that portray Madhesis as second-class citizens 
with questionable loyalties to India as one of the reasons for the escalating violence. An 
example of the heated tone the debate took is provided by Neupane (2016) who holds 
that Madhesis are seen as ‘traitors’ in Kathmandu and asks protestors whether or not their 
violence would ‘make [… them] more Nepali?’ As a reaction, Gupta (2015) reasons that 
Neupane’s claims ‘align with racist voices in Kathmandu’ and realign ‘the notion that 
Kathmandu is an insulated, unconcerned city, distasteful of ethnic uprisings.’
The adherence to tight deadlines
In addition to elite control, tight deadlines affected the legitimacy of institutional reforms 
in Nepal by pressuring actors into making hasty decisions, which resulted in backtrack-
ing on previous commitments without considering their political implications.
Madhesi leaders and activists in the Tarai perceived the constitution-making and ter-
ritorial reform process as rushed, which heightened fears that the opinions of those other 
than the traditional elites would be disregarded. After political elites signed the 16-point 
agreement in June 2015, they referred to what would follow as a ‘fast track’ process, in 
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order ‘to indicate that they adopted the shortest possible process to promulgate the con-
stitution’ (Democracy Resource Center Nepal, 2015). Explanations for this rushed deci-
sion-making include the stress that elites were under following the earthquakes, as well 
as the fact that they had missed many previous deadlines for signing the constitution and 
did not want to be blamed for another failure to meet this obligation. But Madhesis who 
had not been invited to join the discussions felt ‘steamrollered’ by the acceleration of 
reforms (International Crisis Group, 2016: 7). The above-mentioned public consultation 
mechanisms also turned irrelevant as the consultations were shortened to last ‘a mere two 
days’ (Ghale, 2015). Members of the Constituent Assembly argued that they ‘were not 
given enough time to read the draft’ and that discussions of the draft were at times com-
pletely eliminated before a vote took place (International Crisis Group, 2016: 17).
The broader historical context shows why the issue of tight deadlines became particu-
larly relevant in Nepal. The relationship between Madhesis and the state has historically 
been difficult – one Madhesi interviewee, for instance, said that the state had ‘colonialized’ 
the Tarai and Madhesi felt ‘captured’ by Kathmandu.9 But it was the Maoist–Madhesi rela-
tionship that has chiefly angered many activists from 2015 onwards. The constitutional 
deadline forced the Maoists, who had long been the only party committed to federalism, 
into a political compromise that backtracked on their past commitments to Madhesis. Also, 
the Maoist–Madhesi relationship is complex, and specifically upper-caste Madhesis have 
historically supported the NC and not the Maoists (Jha, 2014). But their relationship further 
eroded in the 2007 Madhesi Andolan and following the 2015 constitution, when Madhesis 
felt particularly abandoned and cheated by the Maoists (Sharma, 2016). They perceive the 
Maoists break with the eight-point agreement of 2007 as a major betrayal, after having 
fought alongside the party during the war and having helped it get elected in 2008. As one 
Madhesi civil society leader argues, during ‘the process of constitution making, the Maoist 
party slowly […] left the agenda of the marginalised groups. […] [Thus,] the fault [for the 
protests] mostly lies with the Maoist party, not the government, the NC or UML.’10 Also 
Sha (2015) writes, that the ‘Madhesis are in revolt again [… and are] demanding that the 
agreed principles and previous agreements signed with them be implemented […] The 
feeling of betrayal is strong among the Madhesis […and added] to their apprehension over 
the brute “majoritarian” tendency shown by a few leaders.’
Embedding institutional reforms
In Nepal, the demarcation of federal provinces was embedded in a number of simultane-
ous institutional reforms – listed above – which, in ‘concert’ enhanced fear among 
Madhesis that they were being pushed even further to the margins.
Notably, the reforms tackling Nepal’s federal structure coincided with a revision of 
the citizenship law. Historically, citizenship in Nepal has been based on patrilineal kin-
ship and allowed fathers to transfer citizenship to their children. The 2006 Citizenship 
Act changed this to father or mother, which is the formulation adopted in the new 
constitution as well. However, experts argue that this clause is overridden by other 
articles that discriminate against women and Madhesi women in particular.11 For 
instance, Article 11.7 stipulates that children of a Nepalese father and a foreign mother 
are entitled to citizenship by descent, but children of a Nepalese mother and a foreign 
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father can only obtain naturalised citizenship. This is seen as highly discriminatory 
against Madhesis, who frequently inter-marry with families on the other side of the 
Nepal–India border (Democracy Resource Center Nepal, 2015). It also is especially 
relevant again in a historical context. Discriminatory citizenship laws (that, for 
instance, required applicants to speak Nepali) have long made it difficult for Madhesis 
to obtain citizenship and with it the right to buy land, vote, or run for office (Jha, 
2014). Protestors argued that the proposed reforms added up to increase their discrimi-
nation, reasoning: ‘A constitution that shames me as a woman, a citizen, [and] a 
Madhesi […] is stained [… with] the blood of my fellow citizens’ (in Bhattarai, 2015a). 
The citizenship law is also seen as a catalyst for violence due to its political implica-
tions, as naturalised citizens may not hold constitutional positions such as president or 
prime minister (International Crisis Group, 2016).
Federalist reforms also overlapped with laws on the proportional representation (PR) 
of minorities in parliament, which added to the perception that Madhesis would not only 
be in the minority in all federal units, but would also be under-represented in the centre. 
This underscores the research arguing that territorial institutional arrangements in post-
war states are most helpful when combined in a ‘concert’ of measures to safeguard rep-
resentation at the centre (Cederman et al., 2015; Wolff, 2009).
In Nepal, post-war elections have been held under a mixed electoral system that com-
bines PR provisions with seats distributed through first-past-the-post mechanisms. 
Particularly the Maoists pushed in 2007 to strengthen the PR element in the electoral law 
as they regarded such provisions as a gain for marginalised groups, and as they expected 
to do better under the PR system. Therefore, the ratio of seats distributed through PR and 
first-past-the-post in the interim constitution was approximately 60 to 40. This ratio was 
reversed in the 2015 constitution to reflect the demands of the NC and UML.12 Article 
84.2 of the constitution also requires quotas for representation only in the preparation of 
electoral lists and not – as before – in the distribution of seats. Marginalised groups, 
including Madhesis, feared that this served the interest of elites to disregard principles of 
inclusion and nominate hill people when selecting candidates (Ghale, 2015).
While the electoral law was amended in January 2016, these changes were again 
adopted by the largest political parties without consultation with Madhesis, meaning the 
reforms directly lost all ‘the legitimacy they would have had as the outcome of a political 
negotiation’ (International Crisis Group, 2016, i). The amendment itself generated fur-
ther, but largely peaceful, protest. It also highlighted the different perceptions in the Tarai 
and among political elites of what constitutes legitimate institutional design: the amend-
ment stipulates that ‘economically backward’ members of hill-origin upper-caste groups 
are also eligible for quotas. In the Tarai, this is effectively perceived as rendering any 
provisions that combat inequality between historically advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups irrelevant. Activists reason that the poverty of hill-origin high-caste citizens is not 
linked to their identity, and should thus rather ‘be addressed under poverty alleviation 
measures aimed at the general population’ (Amnesty International, 2015: 5).
Alternative explanations
While this article has focused on grievances stemming from the institutional reform pro-
cess in explaining post-war violence in Nepal, several other and related factors play a 
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role in the violent escalation of Madhesi protests. Most of these factors concern the 
opportunity structure of the Madhesi minority. Above all, the post-war state in Nepal is 
very weak, especially in the Tarai. Security forces are, for instance, often centrally 
recruited or trained, and often fail to implement quotas aimed at increasing the represen-
tation of minorities. They thus tend to have little sense of sudden changes in local politics 
and the public mood.13 This state weakness is reinforced by a large degree of political 
instability at the centre, where a series of 24 unstable coalition governments has assumed 
power since the transition to democracy in 1990. This instability directly affects institu-
tional reforms, as coalitions do not have a full legislative period to negotiate and imple-
ment policies, but several months.14 What also adds to the Madhesis opportunity structure 
is that Madhesis live by and large geographically concentrated and have strong local 
networks already in place, having mobilised for their political demands in the past.
From a regional perspective, perhaps the most important alternative explanation for 
the escalation of protests in 2015 was the role assumed by the Indian government and 
how it enabled the Madhesis’ opportunity structure. Many Nepalis are wary of the politi-
cal intensions of India as a regional hegemon (Miklian, 2008). These feelings were 
amplified after the 2015 earthquakes, as Nepalis complained about insensitive Indian 
media coverage of earthquake victims. When Madhesi activists erected a border block-
ade to back their anti-constitutional protests, Nepal’s government accused its Indian 
counterpart of imposing, financing, and morally supporting the blockade. The histori-
cally discriminative attitude towards Madhesis that portrays them as loyal to India played 
into this narrative. India’s government denies its involvement, but observers witnessed, 
for instance, motorbikes with Indian number plates among the protesters.15 Now that 
India has shifted to supporting the electoral process in Nepal and has urged Madhesi par-
ties to participate in the 2017 local elections, it will likely become more difficult for 
Madhesis to successfully organise their protests (Baral, 2017).
Conclusion
This article has investigated how the politics of federalist reform in Nepal are linked to 
the violent escalation of minority grievances since 2015, focusing on the protests staged 
by the Madhesi minority. I have argued that it is both theoretically and empirically fruit-
ful to study not only institutional designs as determinants of post-war violence, but addi-
tionally to take into account how these designs come into being. Analysing post-war 
Nepal – a case thus far underrepresented in the academic debate on institutions, federal-
ism, and peace – I have validated that rather than disagreement about the federalist 
design in the 2015 constitution alone, several other factors added to the recent violence 
between Madhesi protesters and security forces. These factors include, first, the domi-
nance of the traditional ruling elites in decision-making – that is, high-caste, Hindu men 
from the hills – at the expense of an inclusion of the marginalised communities. A second 
factor contributing to the escalation of violence was that elites followed tight deadlines 
that promoted backtracking on previous commitments made to Madhesis. A third factor 
that I could observe in Nepal was that elites embedded federal reforms into a broader 
institutional reform process that, as a whole, sparked fears of discrimination among 
Madhesis. These factors – as well as alternative explanations discussed above – helped 
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transform Nepal’s new constitution from an ‘end of the peace process’ with the Maoist 
rebels into a catalyst for new ethnic violence.
The article has demonstrated that academic research needs to strive for a deeper con-
ceptual and empirical understanding of the politics of post-war territorial reforms if its 
goal is to inform practitioners engaged in promoting peace after war. However, as a sin-
gle case study, this article comes with inherent limitations that plague any small-n 
research designs concerning the generalisation of findings. Thus, my findings also call 
for future research on the topic. Above all, more comparative studies on the politics of 
institutional reform will help tease out the features of institutional reform that account 
for violence across specific cultural contexts. Furthermore, I have only superficially 
touched upon the linkages between the features of reform processes, such as how the 
acceleration of reform processes due to tight deadlines increased elite control of the pro-
cess. It is also plausible to imagine other linkages between the components of my ana-
lytical framework. For instance, previous research has found tight deadlines to have a 
negative effect on sustainable peace as peace processes grow increasingly complex 
(Pinfari, 2012). Thus, they may shape how embedding single institutional reforms in 
broader and complex reform processes affect the legitimacy of institutional outcomes. 
Important theoretical and empirical insights may be gained from a deeper analysis of 
such linkages.
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Notes
1. Cf. interviewee A, development worker, 23 September 2015; interviewee B, former Inspector 
General of the Police, 26 April 2017; and interviewee C, women’s rights activist, 4 May 2017.
2. In Nepal, the political system has traditionally been dominated by high-caste, Nepali-speaking 
Hindu men from the central hill region. Other ethnic, religious, linguistic, social, and regional 
groups have fundamentally less access to power and wealth. In addition to the Madhesis, the 
traditionally marginalised groups particularly include: women; the Dalit ‘untouchables’ of 
the Hindu caste system; the Tharu ethnic group indigenous to the south-western Tarai; and 
Janajatis (an umbrella term used for indigenous people). Several of these groups have also 
voiced anger over the 2015 constitution. Here, I focus on the Madhesi protests, as these have 
been the most prominent and enduring in post-war Nepal.
3. Interviewee D, Nepali Congress Central Committee member, 19 October 2015.
4. Interviewee E, civil society leader, 9 October 2015.
5. Interviewee F, former Deputy Inspector General of the Armed Police Force, 25 April 2017; 
interviewee G, Human Rights lawyer, 12 May 2015; and interviewee H, Major General in the 
Nepal Army, 15 May 2017.
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6. This provision was amended in January 2016 to appease the protestors.
7. Interviewee I, civil society leader, 25 September 2015.
8. Interviewee J, diplomat, 22 September 2015; and interviewee K, Madhesi lawyer, 5 May 2017.
9. Interviewee L, retired Madhesi police officer, 15 May 2017.
10. Interviewee M, Madhesi civil society leader, 28 September 2015.
11. Interviewee C; interviewee E; and interviewee K.
12. Interviewee E; and interviewee N, Nepali Congress Central Committee member, 12 October 
2015.
13. Interviewee K; interviewee L; and interviewee O, researcher, 5 May 2017.
14. Interviewee P, security analyst, 24 April 2017.
15. Interviewee Q, development worker, 22 September 2015.
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